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ABSTRACT. Modernization, as well as the rapid socioeconomic and political changes that have taken place in Greenland
in the 20th century, have altered the interests and concerns of Greenland’s hunters. For example, these changes can be
observed in the way hunters divide a catch of beluga whales. This article focuses specifically on how beluga hunters have
negotiated new ways of dividing the catch in order to respond to new needs and demands. Today, Greenland is a
heterogeneous society with a number of different socioeconomic groups: a situation that has intensified conflicts and
strategies based on social compartmentalization. The chosen strategies lead us to question the emphasis that social scientists
usually place on community integration. Apart from considering local problems, hunters must also relate to a number of
elaborate Home Rule regulations that influence their rights and control their activity. The Home Rule government has
strengthened the regulations because biologists and international/regional management commissions have concluded that
the stock of beluga whales is substantially depleted. The regional management commission, NAMMCO, thus warns that the
present harvests are several times the sustainable yield, and, if continued, will likely lead to stock extinction within 20 years.
This new concern has made it even more necessary to redefine the rules for catch division and make them locally flexible.
The Home Rule regulations are discussed and compared to local ways of dealing with new concerns and interests.
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RÉSUMÉ. La modernisation, tout comme les changements brusques qui ont eu lieu au Groenland au cours du XXe siècle aux
niveaux socio-économique et politique, ont modifié les intérêts et les préoccupations des chasseurs groenlandais. On peut ainsi
observer ces changements dans la façon dont les chasseurs partagent une prise de béluga. Cet article se penche en particulier sur
la façon dont les chasseurs de bélugas ont négocié de nouveaux modes de partage des prises afin de répondre aux demandes et
aux besoins actuels. Aujourd’hui, le Groenland est une société hétérogène formée de plusieurs groupes socio-économiques
différents, situation qui a intensifié les conflits et les stratégies fondés sur la compartimentation sociale. Les stratégies choisies
nous amènent à remettre en question l’insistance généralement placée par les spécialistes des sciences sociales sur l’intégration
au sein de la collectivité. En plus de tenir compte des problèmes locaux, les chasseurs doivent composer avec plusieurs règlements
complexes de la Loi d’autonomie du Groenland, qui influencent leurs droits et contrôlent leur activité. Le gouvernement autonome
a renforcé les règlements après que les biologistes et les commissions de gestion internationale et régionale ont conclu que le stock
de bélugas connaît un important déclin. La commission de gestion régionale, NAMMCO, prédit ainsi que les prélèvements actuels
représentent plusieurs fois un rendement équilibré et que, s’ils se poursuivent, ils mèneront probablement à l’extinction des stocks
d’ici vingt ans. Ce nouveau sujet de préoccupation rend encore plus nécessaires une redéfinition des règles pour le partage des
prises et leur assouplissement au niveau local. On discute les règlements du gouvernement autonome et on les compare à la façon
dont les communautés abordent leurs intérêts et préoccupations actuels.
Mots clés: pêche au béluga, règles de partage, Groenland, droits de chasse, gestion, changement social
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INTRODUCTION
The complexity and development of Arctic hunting, as
well as its social, cultural, and economic significance,
have always intrigued social scientists. To understand
hunting in the Arctic, researchers have employed a variety
of theoretical and methodological perspectives. Some re-
searchers use comprehensive, formalized descriptions and
analyses of hunting technology, practices, ecology, social
life, and worldview to build a functional perspective from
which to understand the hunting complex. Others use more
diachronic and critical approaches, focusing on the rapid
changes taking place and the role of internal and external
forces in this process. While the functional perspective
focuses on the interconnection and integration of social,
cultural, and ecological elements, the latter approach stud-
ies the changes taking place during the transformation from
traditional to modern forms of organization. Theoretical
differences apart, all researchers put great emphasis on
community unity and integration. Some of the sociocultural
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elements scientists have outlined as central to the integra-
tion of Arctic community life are sharing practices, coop-
erative hunting activities, rules of adoption, name-sharing,
marriage, feelings of community belonging, common user
rights, and intimate knowledge of the social and physical
landscape. Even in the cases where the studies of rapid
cultural changes in Arctic communities focus on the
disintegrative forces of, for example, new technology,
trade, missionary activity, and colonization, researchers
often conclude that certain traditional elements that secure
integration are still present.
This article questions the emphasis normally put on
integrative forces and the strategies of community mem-
bers to sustain community integration. An analysis of
beluga whaling in Greenland, with a primary focus on the
town of Sisimiut, surprisingly indicates that both hunters
and managers have been encouraging processes that are
aimed at further community heterogeneity and exclusion
of users. Management regulations, as well as local prac-
tices, reflect an increasing compartmentalization of social
groups—a process that may be understood as disintegrative,
since more and more hunters are restricted in their hunting
possibilities. These processes, however, are negotiated
and politicized continuously. Paradoxically, they may be
understood as an integrated part of community life today
and an active way to deal with new concerns and priorities.
The central point is that community demarcation has
changed and become increasingly contestable. Processes
of community compartmentalization may be seen as com-
plementary to processes of integration, in the sense that
they offer ways to deal constructively with internal (local)
and external (national and international) factors that influ-
ence community life. Internally, specific user groups are
arguing for economic and cultural gains at the expense of
the other user groups. Externally, political pressure is put
on hunters and managers to decrease the hunt because of
alarming stock estimations. The local and the national
intersect, since bureaucratic solutions at times set an agenda
for local strategies (e.g., they define different categories of
hunters). At the same time, local perceptions of commu-
nity needs and structure may stimulate certain bureau-
cratic structures. All in all, beluga whales and access rights
have become limited goods. The article discusses how
different groups in Greenland have related to new con-
cerns and interests.
Greenlandic communities experienced rapid and thor-
ough cultural changes during the 20th century. The beluga
whale hunting complex is one sphere where such changes
can be traced and examined. Additionally, an analysis of
the complex may reveal how people relate to and bring
about change. Hunting of beluga whales is an activity of
great sociocultural and economic significance in present-
day Greenland (Dahl, 1989, 2000; Sejersen, 1998). During
present-day whaling and catch division, hunters have to
relate to the presence of a variety of socioeconomic groups,
an increasing hunting pressure on beluga whales, and the
need to secure a market for the catch. Hunters have reacted
to these pressures by introducing changes to the structure
of the hunt and practices such as the allocation of rights
and the division of the catch. These changes are taking
place continuously, and they are accompanied by social
tension. For some of the Greenlandic hunters, these changes
include a redefinition of who belongs to the hunter cat-
egory. These processes are different from community to
community, depending upon demography and economy,
among other things. The town of Sisimiut constitutes the
primary point of analysis. In Sisimiut, which is the second-
largest town in Greenland, the conflicts are ever present as
internal conflicts within the diversified group of hunters.
Processes taking place in Sisimiut are compared to those
taking place in smaller communities, where the hunters
face internal occupational conflicts to a much smaller
degree, but have greater external pressure from the new
national management regime and the socioeconomic het-
erogeneity of Greenlandic society in general. Addition-
ally, this article will compare communities in Greenland to
communities elsewhere in the Arctic, to clarify the differ-
ences between their internal and external conflicts and
illustrate their handling of recent conflicts between coop-
erative and individualized ways of hunting.
The beluga whaling complex in Sisimiut was studied
during five fieldwork periods from 1995 to 2000. In the
course of these five years, the beluga whaling complex
underwent major changes due to local economic concerns
and national management obligations. The hunters inter-
viewed were chosen from a number of different sectors,
taking into account economic dependence on hunting,
vessel size, and rights allocated by the Home Rule govern-
ment. Interviews centered on actual whaling activities and
the importance of hunting to each hunter, as he defined it.
Other focal points were the hunters’ understanding of and
experiences with division rules, their reflections on present
and future regulations, and the need for changes. Every
time rumour spread about a successful beluga hunt, all or
some of the participants were interviewed about the hunt,
the number of hunters who participated, and how the
division took place. In addition, the social organization of
whaling was studied during hunting trips. Continual dis-
cussion of the initiatives and regulations with Home Rule
managers and biologists during the five-year period added
valuable perspectives to the analyses of written material
such as reports, regulations, and political papers.
Sisimiut, with its large population and diverse user
groups, represents a location where social change is in-
tense and continually contested. Its wide resource base and
elaborated meat market, which constitute a basis for turn-
ing hunting into a financially rewarding enterprise, further
intensify the conflicts between different categories of
users. On a daily basis, hunters are preoccupied with the
state of resources and the market. In both the hunting
sphere and the market sphere, competition is present to a
high degree, and most hunters are constantly looking for
ways to develop their market possibilities and increase
their income. Since the 1950s, Sisimiut has been one of the
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central towns in Greenland, as it was one of five core towns
chosen for intensive development. The development of the
fishing industry in this region, which has open water year-
round, triggered a development burst that attracted fami-
lies from smaller settlements and other regions. Today,
Sisimiut is a town that explicitly underlines its eager
interest in progress and development (Olsen, 1998;
Thuesen, 1999). In a newspaper advertisement (Sisimiut
Kommune, 1998), Sisimiut municipality proudly an-
nounced that the economic growth rate of 10% in the 1990s
has been used to speed up development. According to a
recent study (Løgstrup, 1999), public institutions make up
54% of the income generated in town, followed by con-
struction work (15%), retail trade (10%), fishing/hunting
(9%), business services (6%), production (5%), and tour-
ism (1%). At the end of 1998, a new airport was opened.
Previously, the only way to get to Sisimiut was by boat, by
helicopter, or over land (hiking, dog-sledge, or skidoo).
The airport is expected to foster new dynamics in the
town—for example, to bring in more tourists as well as
trawler crewmembers, according to the most optimistic.
Beluga hunters come from all groups within the diverse
socioeconomic landscape found in Sisimiut. Out of the
5127 inhabitants in Sisimiut (Grønlands Statistik,
2000:427), there are 210 occupational hunters and 1079
non-occupational hunters registered (in the year 2000). Of
the 210 occupational hunters, about 50 make a living
primarily from hunting all year round, according to the
local association of hunters. The remaining 160 persons
have fishing as their primary occupation, but they still
qualify to apply for an occupational hunting licence be-
cause they receive more than 50% of their income from
hunting and fishing. Hunters who do not qualify for an
occupational hunting licence can hold a non-occupational
hunting licence, available to anyone who is in the national
register. Holders of valid hunting licences are considered
hunters and are allowed by the Home Rule government to
pursue beluga whaling. Thus, stock owners, sport hunters,
and politicians in expensive motorboats hunt side by side
with hunters in small skiffs and fishermen onboard cutters
and trawlers. All participants are eager to get as much
mattak (skin and attached blubber) and meat as possible
because of their high cultural value. For the occupational
hunters in small skiffs and on cutters, the economic incen-
tives are important too.
HUNTING OF BELUGA WHALES
The size of beluga whales (Delphinapterus leucas), as
well as their migration pattern close to the Greenlandic
west coast, makes them valued prey. Adult whales have an
average length of 4 – 6 m and an average weight of 400–
1300 kg (Watson, 1981:166). Depending upon ice condi-
tions, West Greenlandic hunters encounter beluga whales
from February (Sisimiut) to June, when the whales migrate
north towards their summer location in the Canadian High
Arctic. (Belugas are occasionally taken in Avanersuaq
municipality in July–August.) Later in the fall (September
through November), the whales migrate south again along
Greenland’s west coast. During this fall migration, large
numbers are usually taken in Upernavik municipality
(Kapel, 1977; Heide-Jørgensen et al., 1993).
Biologist Mads Peter Heide-Jørgensen (1994:148) ar-
gues that the migration pattern makes the beluga whale
population especially vulnerable to overexploitation be-
cause of the whales’ coastal habits. “During the autumn
they move south along the west coast of Greenland, pass-
ing near a number of settlements with intensive white
whale hunting and where especially females are taken in
large numbers. These coastal areas may act as ‘bottle-
necks’ for the whale population.”
Beluga whales are pursued in different ways, from both
small and large vessels: with nets set out from the coast
(especially in Upernavik municipality); directly from the
ice edge (especially in Uummannaq, Upernavik, and
Avanersuaq municipalities); by encirclement hunting (col-
lective drive hunting) close to the shore (in the Vaigat
Channel and Upernavik municipality, in particular); and in
the open sea (especially in Sisimiut and Kangaatsiaq mu-
nicipalities). During the hunting season, Sisimiut hunters
sail to locations at sea close to the ice or near the banks and
keep a lookout for whales. When whales are spotted, the
hunters pursue them in the open sea while shooting. If a
flock of whales splits up, the hunters split up as well in
order to pursue the wounded whales. The whales are
harpooned as soon as possible to prevent them from sink-
ing. The catch is transported to the ice or brought onboard
a bigger vessel to be divided.
There is no reliable information on the historical harvest
level in Greenland. Even the present catch reporting system
is subject to uncertainty. However, revised catch statistics
for the period 1862 to 1999 have been produced on the basis
of official catch statistics, trade in mattak, sampling of
jaws, and reports from locals and other observers (Heide-
Jørgensen and Rosing-Asvid, 2000). According to these
revised statistics, the total annual landing in the period
1981 – 98 was approximately 689 whales (see Table 1).
Visual aerial surveys of the important wintering area
between Sisimiut and Disko Island, which have been
conducted since 1981, indicate trends in abundance. The
latest survey resulted in an estimated total abundance of
7941 (95% CI = 4264 – 14 789) beluga whales wintering
off the West Greenlandic coast in 1998 – 99 (NAMMCO,
2000a:114). The index count from the surveys conducted
from 1982 to 1999 indicates a decline in abundance of
more than 60% during that period (NAMMCO, 2000a:111).
The scientific committee of NAMMCO concludes that
“the stock is substantially depleted and that present har-
vests are several times the sustainable yield, and, if contin-
ued, will likely lead to stock extinction within 20 years…
It is apparent that harvest must be reduced to about 100
animals per year to have any significant chance of stop-
ping the decline of the stock within the next 10 years”
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(NAMMCO, 2000b:15 – 16). NAMMCO (2000b:16) esti-
mated the 1998 and 1999 harvests to reach 700 a year; in
1998 the catch actually reached 744 (Heide-Jørgensen and
Rosing-Asvid, 2000). These large annual harvests, com-
bined with the alarming scientific population estimates,
have also caused the Greenlandic/Canadian Joint Com-
mission on the Conservation and Management of Narwhal
and Beluga (JCCMNB) to define the Greenlandic hunt as
non-sustainable, and the Joint Commission has urged the
Home Rule government to intervene immediately. The
Home Rule government started to implement the first
management regime for beluga whaling in 1992, with the
purpose of reducing the harvest significantly. On the local
level, the scientific reports, recommendations from
NAMMCO and JCCMNB, and the Home Rule manage-
ment initiatives all add to an already complex setting,
intensifying the process of compartmentalization and het-
erogeneity. The local responses to these reports and initia-
tives are multiple, ranging from mistrust to sincere concern.
However, most local hunters have turned the external
pressure to reduce the harvest into a debate about local
access rights and division rules, trying in this way to keep
the matter under local control. This a central point, which
adds to the understanding of local and national relations of
control with regard to management. The preoccupation
with national and local control primarily stems from the
high cultural and economic significance of beluga whales.
THE VALUE OF BELUGA WHALES
After a successful beluga whale hunt, a hunter’s house-
hold has large amounts of meat and mattak, which are
generously shared with other households of family and
friends. The mattak of beluga whales is considered a
Greenlandic delicacy and is in great demand. It is served as
a snack or as part of a larger meal. During special celebra-
tions like christenings, confirmations, weddings, and birth-
days, a variety of Greenlandic products and dishes are
served to the guests. Mattak is probably one of the most
popular and sought-after food items. Serving mattak and
other foods stemming from Greenlandic resources is un-
derstood as hospitality par excellence, as it links hosts and
guests to a common cultural frame of reference. “Some of
these foods can be difficult to procure, which adds to the
festive mood and marks the occasion as a particular
Greenlandic one” (Kleivan, 1996:154; see also Petersen,
1985; Roepstorff, 1997). Greenlandic foods are strong
symbols of Greenlandic identity and are used to celebrate
the good life (Sejersen, 1998).
The demand for mattak makes beluga whaling an im-
portant activity, economically speaking. Unlike Canada,
Greenland has a large and extremely elaborated market for
country foods. During 1990, which was a very productive
year, West Greenlandic hunters produced 155 216 kg of
meat and mattak for further processing and distribution,
with a total value of DKr 6 131 976. The meat came prima-
rily from beluga whales, but also from narwhals
(Direktoratet for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug, 1994:61).
From Saqqaq, a small community located in the Disko Bay
area, Dahl (1989:30) makes the following observations on
the economic importance of beluga whaling:
The economic position of beluga whale hunting and its
role as a manipulative factor [are] easily understood
when its commercial value (potential or real) is
compared with [that of] other hunting products. In
1980 – 81 the estimated value of mattak alone—if sold—
equalled the commercial value of all traded fishing
products (including capelin) plus sealskins, i.e. of all
other de facto hunting and fishing products traded to
the Royal Greenland Trade Department [called the
Greenland Trade from 1986].
Since the late 1980s, halibut fishing has taken over as
the primary economic activity in Saqqaq, but in some
years beluga whaling is very rewarding. This was the case
in February 1990, when an ice entrapment of whales
(sassat) resulted in a harvest that made up 75% of the total
traded products for the first two months of that year (Dahl,
2000:107).
Apart from trade to external buyers like the Greenland
Trade, the mattak and meat are sold at the local meat
market or to institutions in order to produce cash. The
amount of meat and mattak sold at the market varies. For
some households, this income creates an economic surplus
that can be a safety net in periods of lower hunting success
and can be used to improve the living conditions and
means of production of the household. According to their
own statements, many hunters can afford to buy a new rifle
or a new outboard motor after the beluga whaling season,
as a beluga whale can bring in from 10 000 to 25 000 Dkr
($1700 – $4300 Canadian), depending on size and
TABLE 1. Revised catch statistics for beluga whales in Sisimiut
and West Greenland 1981–98 (adopted from Heide-Jørgensen and
Rosing-Asvid, 2000).
Year Sisimiut Total in West Greenland
1981 62 1017
1982 95 894
1983 99 601
1984 25 763
1985 25 611
1986 695
1987 696
1988 275
1989 499
1990 1063
1991 550
1992 687
1993 80 798
1994 105 618
1995 116 780
1996 131 542
1997 101 576
1998 125 744
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purchaser. Beluga whaling may thus be categorized as a
strategic activity, in contrast to seal hunting, which repre-
sents a recurrent activity. Both types of activities are
important to sustain the household. The recurrent activi-
ties support the household on a daily basis throughout
most of the year, while the strategic activities create
economic elbow room within a relatively short period. The
space of economic freedom creates multiple possibilities
that are important in sustaining the social and economic
life of the household. Although beluga whaling is a strate-
gic activity, it is also a venture activity (Wenzel, 1991:83)
in the sense that its success is highly uncertain. In many
cases, hunters return empty-handed after a day or a week
searching for whales, and the expected economic elbow-
room has been turned into expenditure. The monetary
importance of living resources and the elaborated market
for country foods make Greenland stand out compared to
Canada and Alaska, where the selling of country foods is
limited. Actually, the market orientation of many hunters
has produced mixed responses from community members,
as they experience a decrease in the amount of meat and
mattak being shared freely (Møller and Dybbroe, 1981:139;
Nuttall, 1991:220). Hunters are caught in a moral dilemma
(the trader’s dilemma) between sociocultural norms and
economic requirements. Market-oriented hunters are ac-
cused by other community members of disrupting the
cooperation and maintenance of the community and of
eroding the traditional moral code of the hunting complex,
which has sharing as one of the main pillars.
Greenlandic hunters are certainly interested in finding
good market possibilities and prices in order to sustain
their households and maintain equipment. Since most
beluga whaling is cooperative in character, the division of
the catch among participants is of paramount importance
for hunters who engage in market activities and who
depend economically on the sale of mattak and meat. The
rule of division, in fact, becomes as important as the actual
hunt. At the flensing scene, when participants negotiate
how to divide the catch, expectations are therefore high.
The amount of beluga whale meat and mattak a hunter can
bring home is dependent upon the rules of division. An
examination of these rules in a historical perspective
reveals that they have changed tremendously since the
beginning of the 20th century. At the local level, the social
organization of the hunt, the subsequent compulsory catch
division (agguaaneq), and further dispositions at the mar-
ket are probably the most debated issues associated with
beluga whaling, apart from animal presence and the volun-
tary sharing of meat gifts (pajuppoq) from the hunters’
“private” meat (for a discussion of division and sharing,
see Dahl, 2000:174 – 190; Petersen, 1970:85 – 91).
RULES OF DIVISION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A variety of ethnographic records from different parts
of Greenland describe how hunters divided beluga whales
when they were caught from kayaks (Bendixen, 1921a – e;
Holm and Petersen, 1921; Birket-Smith, 1924; Thalbitzer,
1941; Petersen, 1970, 1972; Hertz, 1977; Buijs, 1993;
Nuttall, 1991; Robbe, 1994; Dahl, 2000). The kayak hunter
who threw the first harpoon was considered the principal
hunter. The second hunter to throw a harpoon was per-
ceived to be a helper. There could be up to six helpers. A
beluga whale was divided according to a system based on
the hunter’s role in the hunt, where role was determined
primarily on the basis of when the hunter harpooned or
touched the whale. Despite local differences in the size and
quality of the shares allocated to hunters, the local rules for
catch division were quite similar throughout Greenland.
Regional differences apart, the system of division
(ningerpoq), which was applied primarily to larger ani-
mals, was known elsewhere in the Arctic (Damas, 1972;
Wenzel, 1995). If a hunter succeeded in killing a whale
single-handed, other hunters would claim to be helpers
just by touching the whale. The catch was therefore not the
exclusive property of the hunter who killed it. Others had
the right to claim a share, except when the catch was within
the settlement area or already loaded on a sledge (Petersen,
1970).
This rule of division based on each hunter’s role in the
hunt started to be questioned when new concerns and
interests emerged. One of the principal changes was the
emergence of whaling participants in wooden boats (Rask,
1993), skiffs, cutters and trawlers, who demanded larger
shares. Hertz (1977) describes a transformation phase in
the small community of Ikerasaarssuk, north of Sisimiut in
Kangaatsiaq municipality, where kayaks and small boats
occasionally hunted together. Here, the hunter who har-
pooned the beluga whale would get one flipper, and the
person who killed it, the other. After they had received the
flippers as a token of their role in the hunt, the beluga
whale was flensed and the meat and mattak were placed in
a number of piles equivalent to the number of hunters or
the number of boats. Thus the rule of division would alter
from time to time, according to the persons negotiating the
division rules.
Hunters started to consider participation in the hunt as
more important than role: a division practice termed
agguaaneq. Dahl (2000:79 – 80) mentions an incident in
Saqqaq, where an old hunter took part in an encirclement
hunt in the shallow water of a bay:
As usual great confusion seemed to arise when a whale
came up and more than twenty guns were shot at the
same time. In the tumult, the reactive response of the
old hunter was far too slow, and before he had aimed at
the game the wounded beluga had dived again.
Furthermore, in the tumult that now arose, the old
hunter came in the sight line of the other boats amid
shouts for him to get out of the way.
Despite his questionable contribution to the hunt, the old
hunter received a full share simply because he participated.
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The “boat-egalitarian” principle of “one boat–one share,”
and thus the focus on participation, became the predomi-
nant way of dividing the catch as more hunters started to
participate and claim shares. Hertz (1977) mentions that
the focus on participation (only flippers were divided
according to role) was maintained even if one of the hunters
was in a kayak and the others in small wooden boats. The
traditional rules were negotiated and changed to include
the increasing number of participants and the diversity of
vessels. It was not, however, a painless process.
The flensing scene became a battlefield of interests and
constant negotiation between hunters. First of all, the hunt-
ers had to decide who could be defined as participants: i.e.,
did all hunters pursue the whale(s), or did some turn up after
the hunt? When this complex problem had been settled, the
division principle had to be decided upon. If participants on
board a bigger boat killed a beluga whale together with a
participant in a skiff, the latter could claim half the whale
according to the “boat-egalitarian” principle. However, the
participants could decide to divide the whale according to
the number of participants. This “participant-egalitarian”
principle of division would favour the bigger boats, while
the former rule favoured participants in skiffs. Hertz
(1995:139) mentions another rule of division from
Uummannaq municipality, where the “participant-egalitar-
ian” principle was elaborated to take the capital investment
of boat owners into consideration. Here, participants using
wooden boats and cutters would receive an additional share
for the boat when the catch was divided according to the
number of hunters who participated. This elaboration served
the bigger boats and their capital investments to a further
extent. Increasingly, capital investment became an argu-
ment to legitimize changes in division rules.
At the flensing scene, participants have to discuss which
rule to apply and thus decide upon which socioeconomic
group to favour. The actual pile given to each hunter is
determined by drawing lots, as described in length by Dahl
(1985, 2000). This practice is also used when dividing a
minke whale caught by hunters collectively (Sejersen, 1998).
The cooperative nature of beluga whaling in Greenland
and the emphasis on shares to all participants stand in
contrast to the way in which the Kaηigmiut of Kotzebue
Sound, Alaska, have altered beluga whaling and catch
division, as recently described by Morseth (1997).
Eschscholtz Bay in Kotzebue Sound, especially around
Elephant Point, is considered the major harvest area for
beluga in Alaska. Not only Kaηigmiut, but also people
from far away come there to join the hunt (Feldman,
1986). The surroundings and the technology are quite
similar to the Greenlandic context, but the Kaηigmiut
have chosen to organize the hunt quite differently. Tradi-
tionally, the Kaηigmiut pursued beluga whaling as a
cooperative hunt. Hunters in kayaks encircled the whales
and drove them toward shore, where, entrapped in shallow
water, they were easier to kill. Each hunter was entitled to
keep the whales he had killed (Feldman, 1986; Lucier and
VanStone, 1995; Morseth, 1997). A similar rule found in
the Mackenzie Delta is described by Nuligak (1966:15 –
17). Owner marks on harpoons indicated a cooperative
hunt with individual acquisition rights. Morseth argues
that hunters using faster boats and high-powered rifles
have undermined this cooperative organization of the
hunt. These hunters have started to pursue whales in the
open sea, and they do it individually. Cooperation during
the first phase of the hunt is no longer necessary for these
hunters to be successful. Hunters with slower boats, who
base their hunting success on cooperative hunting in
shallow water, have seen their access possibilities erode,
as the whales are now hunted at sea. The hunt has become
much more individualized. As a result, a few hunters
(those with the best technology) succeed at the expense of
everyone else. “We used to be of one mind,” a hunter
complains (quoted in Morseth, 1997:248). Another elder
criticizes the mentality of the younger hunters with their
fast-going boats: “They just try to get them on their own;
they don’t give people who aren’t as strong a chance to
catch them. If they rounded them up into the shallow
water, even the old and not so strong [hunters] would have
a chance. We end up getting shares from someone else”
(Morseth, 1997:248). Conflicts and confrontations have
increased since the 1970s, because hunters who formerly
hunted at Sisualik have come to Eschscholtz Bay and
introduced a highly competitive hunting practice. Several
crews pursue the same whale, which then goes to the crew
that is able to shoot it first (Feldman, 1986:168). Coopera-
tive hunting, common access, and individual property
rights have been turned into individual hunting, limited
access, and individual property rights. The reason for this
change, as Morseth correctly notes, is not associated
solely with the introduction of bigger, faster boats and
technology, as the social organization is not inherent in
the technology. In Greenland, where the technology is
very similar, a cooperative hunt is maintained in addition
to inclusive division rules.
In Nuussuaq, Upernavik municipality in Greenland,
eskimologist Bo Albrechtsen (2001) has observed an indi-
vidualization of the hunt since 1997. Only hunters who
have fired at a specific whale can now claim a share.
Participation in the collective hunt is no longer enough:
participation has been redefined and closely linked to
shooting at and hitting a specific whale. Unlucky and
unskilful hunters or hunters with inadequate technology
have lost their role in the hunt and do not receive shares
anymore. Albrechtsen mentions that not all hunters find
this morally right. In one instance, a young hunter man-
aged to kill a whale alone while he was out hunting
together with other skiffs. According to the new rules, he
could keep the whole whale to himself, but he did not feel
good about it. He looked for advice to his mother, who
suggested that he use the old division rules, which he did.
In a sense, this kind of individualization is a redefinition of
participation that makes it correspond more to the role-
oriented division rules previously known. The Home Rule
government made encirclement hunting illegal in 1995 in
˙
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order to limit the harvest, and this regulation, according to
Albrechtsen, has eroded the collective organization of
beluga whaling to a large extent.
A study of Inuit knowledge about the southern Baffin
beluga (Kilabuk, 1998) indicates that the organization of
the hunt has changed as in Greenland and become less
cooperative. Some hunters raise worries about the sense of
rush and urgency of today’s hunts, which have resulted in
ineffective and dangerous hunting practices. They blame
the quota system and the increasing number of hunters:
“Today the elders feel that to restore some order in the
hunting of Beluga whales, traditional laws and practices
need to be applied and adhered to more strictly” (Kilabuk,
1998:55).
In Sisimiut, hunters still uphold the collective aspect of
beluga whaling, and all participants get a share. The ques-
tion is, however, how big a share each participant should
receive. For a long time there has been a conflict between
the “boat-egalitarian” and the “participant-egalitarian” rules
of division. The boat-egalitarian principle that has been
upheld for a long period is certainly to the advantage of the
participants using skiffs, and it may indicate the dominant
position of this group and their ability to retain social
control. But the increasing numbers of participants using
bigger vessels question this position. They want to intro-
duce a rule of division that favours participants on bigger
boats (and their capital investment) to a greater extent.
Several rules—including participant-egalitarian princi-
ples—have been suggested. They have created frustration,
confusion, and conflicts at the flensing locations. On one
occasion, a trawler even departed with the entire catch,
leaving angry participants in skiffs in its wake (a similar
incident is mentioned in Hertz, 1977:94 – 96).
In addition, occupational hunters have increasingly
aired feelings of discontent with the rights of non-occupa-
tional hunters. The former group finds it unfair that the
latter group can claim a full share, as they do not depend
upon hunting. Increasing conflicts, endless discussions,
and dissatisfaction led persons who hunted daily from
skiffs to suggest a new rule of division that would reduce
the shares of participants with a non-occupational hunting
licence to half the normal size, thus introducing a principle
of socioeconomic priority. The new rule, introduced in
1994, was received with mixed feelings. On one occasion,
participants with non-occupational hunting licences felt
so unfairly treated that, according to their own statements,
they called the police and asked them to settle the dispute.
On another occasion, the argument over division rules
turned into a fistfight at the flensing scene.
Participants use several reasons to legitimize their pre-
ferred rule of division, including differences in hunting
licences, vessel sizes, socioeconomic background, and
hunting experience. The conflicts are not solely between
participants holding different hunting licences, but are
also present between participants holding the same hunt-
ing licence. In the latter case, vessel size constitutes the
major problem.
In an attempt to end these conflicts, the group of skiff
hunters put forward a detailed proposal in 1997. They
suggested a new rule of division based on a very compli-
cated combination of known rules, in the hope that it could
reflect the wishes and needs of hunters belonging to differ-
ent socioeconomic groups. One paragraph in this sugges-
tion is based on the old system of role in the hunt. It
stipulates that the hunter who harpoons a narwhal gets the
tusk. There is no role principle associated with division of
beluga whales. Two paragraphs deal with the question of
participation and the exclusion of hunters who enter the
hunt too late or do not participate. One has to participate
(but not necessarily shoot and hit a whale) in the actual
hunt: sighting is not understood as participation. Finally,
the proposal introduces a system of division between
different categories of participants. The size of the shares
to be allotted to participants depends on their socioeco-
nomic status as reflected in their belonging to one of three
groups of hunters outlined in the proposal: skiff hunters,
big-vessel hunters (cutters and trawlers), and non-occupa-
tional hunters. The three groups are perceived to have
different economic needs invested in whaling, and skiff
hunters look upon themselves as the most needy because
they do not have a steady income.
In the 1997 proposal, the decisive factor that regulates
the actual size of the hunting share to be allotted to each
group of hunters is sighting.
a) If a skiff hunter sights the whales, all vessels with
occupational hunters are allotted the same amount of
meat and mattak (boat-egalitarian principle), and non-
occupational hunters get only half of a hunting share.
b) If a person on board a big vessel sights the whales, skiff
hunters can claim only half a hunting share, and non-
occupational hunters receive a quarter of a hunting
share.
c) If a non-occupational hunter sights the whales first, he
can claim a full hunting share. In this case, all partici-
pating boats get a full hunting share, independently of
the socioeconomic status of hunters.
Thus, division of a catch of one or more beluga whales
(or narwhals) depends on participation, role, and status
(based on affiliation to one of the three hunter groups).
Sighting, which triggers the division along status lines,
does not correspond directly with role, which traditionally
linked the hunter and a specific part of the animal (e.g.,
tusk of narwhal, skin of polar bear, flipper or meat section
of seal and beluga whale). Sighting, as it is used in this
proposal, determines the overall division of catch portions
to all participating vessels. The introduction of sighting as
the determining factor in catch division provides a new
tool to deal with the diversity of hunters, but also a way to
underpin the division.
In practice, however, the new rules were too compli-
cated and did not fall on fertile ground. Instead, hunters
today try to avoid unpleasant conflicts by hunting with
like-minded hunters. Some trawler skippers, for example,
have stopped announcing the sighting of beluga whales
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publicly over the VHF radio. Instead, they use cellular
phones to contact fellow trawlers and thus avoid the
participation of skiff hunters, who claim large shares.
Skiff hunters also try to put together a homogeneous group
when whaling. By doing this, they can retain social control
and a division rule that supports their economic interests.
On some occasions, however, the different groups still
find themselves in conflict. In January 2001, an individual
non-occupational hunter filed a lawsuit against a group of
occupational hunters for dividing the catch according to
the new rule of division. The hunter lost the case and has
now appealed. Although the new rule is not fully accepted,
it is an attempt by some of the occupational hunters to
assert active control over important parts of the overall
management regime that have not yet been taken over by
the Home Rule government. Status quo with regard to
division rules has not eroded local control in this sphere;
rather, it has intensified conflicts and stimulated in-group
organization of the hunt. However, local control and local
priorities are challenged by the Home Rule management
strategies aimed at significantly reducing the harvest level.
HOME RULE ALLOCATION OF HUNTING RIGHTS
A serious management crisis was triggered in the early
1990s, when the newly established Joint Commission on
the Conservation and Management of Narwhal and Beluga
(JCCMNB) urged Canada and Greenland to implement
management regimes that would substantially reduce hunt-
ing of beluga whales. “The rate of decline of the stock
requires that the effective implementation of such meas-
ures should take place on an urgent basis” (JCCMNB,
1993). In Greenland, this was particularly urgent, as there
was no regime to regulate beluga whaling with the purpose
of conserving and managing the stock.
The Home Rule Department of Fisheries, Hunting and
Agriculture followed the recommendations of JCCMNB
and took initiatives to create a management regime that
could limit the hunt, even though many local hunters
perceived the beluga whales to be plentiful. The Depart-
ment produced a series of new regulations, primarily
allocating different access and disposition rights to differ-
ent groups of hunters. In 1992, the first order to regulate
beluga whaling was adopted (Grønlands Hjemmestyre,
1992). It can be described as a minimal order, with no real
effects on the level of hunting (see Table 1). The political
discussions in the Greenlandic parliament concerning
management of beluga whales were very airy in the early
1990s. Politicians were afraid to make a strong stance on
the issue because of the importance of beluga whales.
However, subsequent orders, implemented in 1993, 1995,
and 1996, put a number of restrictions in place to reduce
the hunt (Grønlands Hjemmestyre, 1993, 1995, 1996).
This national allocation of rights is a process parallel to
the changes in division rules at the local level. The Home
Rule government bases the management regime primarily
on a differentiation of the user, access, and disposition
rights allocated to different groups of hunters. User rights
define the right one has to use the resource; access rights
outline the requirements to get access to the resource and
thus one’s possibility to practice one’s user right; and
disposition rights define one’s right to dispose of the catch.
The fundamental basis of many Home Rule regulations
is a hunting licence system based on two hunter categories:
occupational and non-occupational hunters. With respect
to beluga whaling, both groups of hunters have maintained
their right to participate (equal user rights), although many
occupational hunters lobbied intensively to deprive non-
occupational hunters of those rights. The sequence of
Home Rule orders slowly introduced a division of the
occupational hunter group into four sub-groups, each rep-
resenting a specific socioeconomic group. Each of these
sub-groups is allocated different access rights and dispo-
sition rights. In this way, the Home Rule orders reflect and
actually support an increasing division and
compartmentalization of the hunters. The socioeconomic
division is done on the basis of vessel sizes. It is thus
presumed that when you hunt from a boat of a certain size,
you belong to a specific group of hunters. The vessel is the
determining category, not the hunter—a fact that has
caused problems, as will be shown below.
Hunters using small skiffs and cutters (under 25 Gross
Register Tonnage [GRT]) are allocated the right to hunt,
consume, and sell beluga whales without restrictions.
Hunters using vessels between 25 and 50 GRT are allowed
to hunt beluga whales without any restrictions, but only for
household consumption. These hunters are consequently
restricted in their right to dispose of the catch as they
please and are cut off from an economic possibility (limi-
tation of disposition right). Hunters on board trawlers
between 50 and 79.9 GRT are allowed to take two beluga
whales on each trip to supply the vessel. These hunters
face quota restrictions (limitation of access rights) and are
not allowed to consume or share the catch outside the
vessel (further limitation of disposition right). Finally,
hunters are not allowed to go beluga whaling at all if they
are on board vessels bigger than 79.9 GRT (deprivation of
access rights). In real life, licensed hunters often alternate
between different sizes of vessels. A skiff hunter may, for
example, choose to join as a crewman on a big trawler for
a period, or to join a small trawler pursuing beluga whal-
ing. His access and disposition rights with reference to
beluga whales change every time he changes vessel. This
has caused some confusion. To continue beluga whaling,
some trawler skippers would bring a skiff along. When
beluga whales were sighted, some of the crewmembers
would pursue them in the skiff. According to the Home
Rule regulations, they would thus have the best access and
disposition rights (they could hunt and sell as much as they
please). Clearly this practice does not correspond with
the intentions of the Home Rule. Basically, hunters in
economic need were to be favoured, and not trawler
crewmembers, who receive a salary. Although the
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regulations are based on a technical measure (vessel size),
their aim is to support certain socioeconomic groups of
hunters and reduce beluga whaling at the same time. The
Home Rule had to file a new order in 1996 to make it clear
that allocating rights to vessels of certain sizes was not a
technical issue, but a socioeconomic one. In the 1996
order, the Home Rule explicitly points out that hunters
(often crewmembers) on board bigger vessels may not
hunt beluga whales from the big vessel itself or from skiffs
that they have in tow. However, nothing in the order
restricts occupational or non-occupational hunters from
beluga whaling; a crewmember on board a trawler can go
beluga whaling in his spare time without restrictions if he
uses a small vessel. In practice, the regulations limit the
access rights of many hunters, not their user rights. Thus
the restrictions are not de jure limitations of user rights;
they are rather de facto limitations, because many
crewmembers (having an occupational hunting licence)
are only able to go beluga whaling from bigger vessels.
The Home Rule is very reluctant to limit Greenlanders’
user rights, although a few species (polar bear, minke
whale, fin whale, and walrus) are restricted to occupa-
tional hunters only, except in Qaanaaq and Ittoqqortoormiit
municipalities. Instead, the Home Rule prefers to limit the
access rights and disposition rights of different groups of
hunters. In adopting these kinds of management tools, the
Home Rule regulations to some extent correspond to the
wishes of the skiff hunters, who would like to see other
occupational hunters restricted in their rights because they
are less dependent upon hunting. In Greenland, the process
of rights allocation is one that gradually promotes occupa-
tional specialization and supports the economies and house-
holds of small-scale hunters. Non-specialized hunters and
fishermen, who hunt to contribute to the household economy
during certain periods (e.g., unemployment), are given
fewer opportunities than before, because they cannot ob-
tain an occupational hunting licence or because their
access and disposition rights have been reduced. This has
created problems for some households. A recent change in
the issuing of hunting licences also supports this process
(Sejersen, 1998). Today, applicants have to prove that they
get at least 50% of their annual income from hunting and
fishing from vessels under 75 GRT.
The national beluga management regime has produced
mixed responses at the local level because local control is
lost in the wake of an inclusive national management
regime. The following section examines the national regu-
lations with respect to their implications for local control.
NATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY
HUNTING TERRITORIES
The new Home Rule regulations, based on a differentia-
tion of socioeconomic groups and licence holders, have
introduced a new type of discrimination, according to Dahl
(1998). Basically, the regulations are based on the idea that
Greenland is one national community where one law has to
apply. The national regulations erode the social control of
small communities such as Saqqaq. Dahl (1998, 2000)
describes the management of hunting prior to the introduc-
tion of Home Rule as based on local social control of a
community hunting territory (see also Petersen, 1963,
1965; Brøsted, 1986; Haller, 1986). A person from outside
the community was allowed to hunt in the local hunting
territory as long as he was defined as a member of the
community. One could be defined as such by staying
overnight for a few days, so the membership rules were not
exclusive. But the right to hunt was closely linked to the
social obligation to accept the local customs of hunting
methods, division, and sharing. The hunting territory was
defined in social terms rather than in geographical terms.
By combining rights and obligations, the community was
able to enforce social control, maintain the network of
social relations, and underpin community continuity. “The
heart of the matter is that we deal with a society in which
access to the territory is defined by membership in a
community, and within this the access is non-exclusive”
(Dahl, 1998:68). The establishment of the Greenlandic
Home Rule in 1979 has consolidated Nuuk as the admin-
istrative and political centre, and the control has been put
in the hands of politicians, bureaucrats, and the police
force. The Home Rule has taken over and monopolized the
allocation of user, access, and disposition rights to citizens
in Greenland (Dahl, 1998:74 – 75), and this change has
influenced community territories and community control.
Furthermore, Home Rule has based its allocation of rights
on the assertion that all inhabitants have equal user rights
to the Greenlandic territory and its resources. Greenland
has been turned into one hunting territory.
In 1990, the Home Rule parliament decided to employ a
number of hunting officers (jagtbetjente) to strengthen the
monitoring of hunters. Today, the system of hunting offic-
ers is being further elaborated. Despite general content-
ment with the system, the size of Greenland makes the tasks
of the few hunting officers immense and nearly impossible
to carry out. Employment of hunting officers is an institu-
tionalization of authority and can be seen as a challenge to
the local, embedded authority based on local knowledge
and personal competence. The transfer of control and
allocation of rights and obligations from the local commu-
nity to the national community is not the heart of the
problem, according to Dahl (1998). It is far more problem-
atic that the local control is evaporating and is being
replaced by a weak or nonexistent national control system
(hunting officers). Conflicts will emerge when there is a
vacuum in the social control that encloses hunting.
At the local level, still exemplified by Saqqaq, this
process is reflected in the increasing number of big vessels
coming from other Greenlandic locations far away. These
vessels hunt beluga whales within the community terri-
tory, but without respect for local customs. Today, even
hunters from Sisimiut travel 350 km in skiffs and cutters to
pursue beluga whaling near Saqqaq. The big vessels
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operate legitimately within the borders of the national
community, but outside the control of the national hunting
officers. They often hunt away from the local hunters in
order to avoid division conflicts. If they hunt together with
local hunters, they seldom respect the local division rules.
In practice, they hunt in “no-man’s land” (Dahl, 1998:66).
No one can control their hunting methods or the number of
beluga whales they hunt, which is significant, exceeding
the number hunted by Saqqaq hunters (Dahl, 1998:67). In
1995, the Home Rule decided to ban encirclement whaling
as practiced by local Saqqaq hunters, but only to limit the
whaling pursued by trawlers. This process of nation build-
ing, which is reflected in the increasing problems of
Saqqaq beluga whalers, can be described as a transfer of
control of access and disposition from the local and per-
sonal level to the national and impersonal level. Hunters
from regions where encirclement is not practiced sup-
ported the ban. Faced with possible limitations on their
own hunt, southern hunters singled out the North
Greenlandic encirclement whaling as the major reason
why the harvest in Greenland is so high, and thus avoided
severe restrictions on their own hunt. Although the ban
reduced the harvest for a few years, it is highly question-
able whether the harvest will decrease in the long run, as
hunters have adopted effective new methods. The major
change to be observed is the change from an organized
community hunt to an unorganized individual hunt.
The Home Rule regulations, which are nationally com-
prehensive, thus stand out as discriminating, according to
Dahl (1998), because they overrule local customs and
local control. Furthermore, the regulations, seen from a
Saqqaq point of view, actually favour the outside vessels,
because the community’s collective hunting practice was
banned by the 1995 regulation. People in Saqqaq face an
increasing number of large vessels and skiffs operating in
what they perceive as their hunting territory, but these
vessels are outside their community control and network.
Furthermore, the hunting activities of the big vessels are
forcing the whales away from shore and thus away from
Saqqaq hunters. Some municipalities have issued local
bylaws in order to restrict whaling pursued by non-locals.
In Avanersuaq in northern Greenland, the municipality
has issued bylaws that order beluga and narwhal hunters to
harpoon the whales before they are shot with rifles
(Avanersuup Kommunea, 1986)—a practice that non-
locals seldom use. In Uummannaq, the municipality has
implemented elaborate bylaws for beluga whaling. Rules
specifying the sizes of vessels allowed in the hunt and the
division of the catch are explicitly noted in order to
strengthen local control. Only boats smaller than 30 feet
can participate, and they must not be accompanied by
bigger vessels. This restriction limits the number of out-
side vessels without questioning their user rights. In
Upernavik, similar bylaws have been implemented. Con-
sequently, bigger vessels tend to hunt farther out to sea.
These regulations try to restrict non-local participation
and thus have a geographical preference.
While hunters in Saqqaq, Upernavik, Uummannaq, and
Avanersuaq are trying to deal with an increasing number
of external vessels legitimately pursuing beluga whaling
in what they perceive as their area, hunters in Sisimiut are
trying to deal with the internal differentiation and new
concerns of the hunter community. In both cases, the
demarcation of socioeconomic status groups and distribu-
tion of rights and resources are the principal issues. The
Home Rule regulations enforce the process of socioeco-
nomic differentiation while disregarding geographical dif-
ferentiation. The reason may be ascribed to the
nation-building strategy pursued by the Home Rule.
Notwithstanding these management initiatives, the
existing hunting regulations have not decreased the har-
vest level, and the Home Rule government has thus been
unable to reverse the asserted decline in the beluga whale
population.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The transformations in the rules applied to dividing a
catch of beluga whales in Greenland indicate new con-
cerns, practices, and interests. The rapid technological,
cultural, political, and socioeconomic changes create new
contexts that hunters have to live with and actively re-
spond to. Hunters are not only spectators to these changes
but are engaged in making changes as well. Negotiation
about division rules is an example. When the first hunters
started to use small wooden vessels at the beginning of the
20th century, some of these hunters’ interests and priori-
ties changed, and they were able to negotiate/enforce a
new rule of division that benefited them at the expense of
the kayak hunters. The previous relation between a hunter’s
role in the hunt and the actual hunting share was replaced
by rules stressing participation as the main principle,
thereby indicating a shift from individual to collective
acquisition. Since then, equal rights to participate and to
claim a share in the catch have been the ideological core of
beluga whaling in Greenland. Cooperative hunting and
inclusive rules of division have been very important in
Greenland despite the introduction of new technology.
The introduction of new technology has triggered
changes, but has not determined either the specific organi-
zation of the hunt or the division rules. A comparison to
other Arctic regions indicates that hunters elsewhere have
managed the introduction of new technology differently.
In Kotzebue Sound, Alaska, the Kaηigmiut have aban-
doned cooperative beluga whaling. The individualized
hunt favours hunters using fast boats and high-powered
rifles at the expense of other hunters. This individualized
hunt in Alaska is different from the collective hunt in
Greenland, although changes towards individualization
have been observed lately in North Greenland. In Green-
land, everyone has the right to participate in beluga whal-
ing, and all participants get a share of the catch
independently of their role during the hunt. This is a
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widely accepted cultural value in Greenland. The main
conflicts at the flensing scene are about how big a share
each participant can claim. It depends greatly on which
group of hunters the participant is thought to belong to.
Participants use vessel size, hunting licence, and socio-
economic status when determining group affiliation. Some-
times the division may fall out to the advantage of the
group of skiff hunters; at other times, it may favour cutters
and trawlers.
The socioeconomic development in Greenland has in-
tensified a diversification of the hunter community, not
only in terms of technology but also with regard to socio-
economic strategies. The Home Rule of Greenland places
no limitations on hunters’ user rights and few limitations
on their access rights. Consequently, skiff hunters, who
depend economically upon small-scale hunting, are seen
whaling together with non-occupational hunters,
crewmembers on shrimp trawlers, and fishermen on cut-
ters. Locally, hunters try to deal with the diversified hunter
community and new economic concerns by suggesting
new rules of division, which basically are allocations of
disposition rights. The new rules are normally based on a
further compartmentalization of the hunter community.
The process of compartmentalization can be observed
in the Greenlandic town of Sisimiut, where many different
socioeconomic groups are represented. Economically
speaking, the hunt carries different importance to each of
these groups. At the flensing scenes, tension emerges
among the groups. Occupational hunters have started to
question whether non-occupational hunters should receive
the same amount of meat and mattak as occupational
hunters. The controversies between occupational and non-
occupational hunters are accompanied by controversies
between different socioeconomic sectors within the group
of occupational hunters. Hunters on board vessels like
cutters and trawlers claim bigger shares of the catch
because they want to consider the number of crewmembers
and the size of the capital investment in the large vessels.
However, skiff hunters have argued that occupational
hunters on trawlers are not in the same need of beluga
whaling as they are. The combination of increasing con-
flicts and discussions about division rules at the flensing
scene made Sisimiut skiff hunters put forward a written
proposal that reflected the socioeconomic diversity of the
town. It combined three principles: role, participation, and
socioeconomic status. It is unique in the sense that it
allowed cooperative beluga whaling to continue. It does
not limit any of the hunters’ user and access rights, but
restricts disposition rights depending upon socioeconomic
status. The division rule is a further compartmentalization
of the hunter community, but simultaneously a means to
maintain the integration of the hunter community by not
depriving anyone of user and access rights. However, the
proposal has not been fully accepted by the strong group of
non-occupational hunters, whose shares are cut signifi-
cantly when this rule is followed. Presently, the rule is
neither applied on all occasions nor accepted by all hunt-
ers. This uncertain status is the cause of further conflicts.
The strategy of social compartmentalization and occu-
pational specialization is also pursued by the Home Rule
government, which since the early 1990s has tried to
decrease the level of harvest significantly, following the
advice of biologists and regional/international manage-
ment commissions. The primary management tool used in
beluga whaling regulations is the allocation of different
rights to distinct socioeconomic groups. Skiff hunters are
given the highest priority, while hunters pursuing whaling
from the biggest trawlers are not allowed to hunt anymore.
The strategy of social compartmentalization is evident in
the last two regulations, which divide occupational hunt-
ers, who previously had the same rights, into four socio-
economic groups determined on the basis of vessel size,
each group with different rights.  The social
compartmentalization has much in common with the so-
cial process taking place in the town of Sisimiut. This
similarity between local and national processes is not
always the case. In some cases, the Home Rule govern-
ment has been discriminatory towards local ways of man-
aging and controlling beluga whaling since its management
system is based on a national and unifying agenda. How-
ever, the government lacks proper means of national con-
trol. This vacuum with respect to social control has made
some local communities unable to deal effectively with the
increasing numbers of non-local beluga whalers in their
hunting territory. In order to reduce the vacuum, national
wildlife officers have been employed to control local
hunters. However, increasing national control interferes in
local ways of combining rights, obligations, and control.
At the local level, the process of social compartment-
alization and loss of control has been accompanied by
conflicts, much negotiation, and social strain. The possi-
bility for hunters to take action and negotiate at the flensing
scene may be eroded by the increasing number of Home
Rule regulations dividing the hunters into fixed groups,
each with its rights and privileges, and by the wildlife
officers whose mandate is to inspect local practices. The
continual discussion of needs and equality will solidify in
the regulations and leave the privileges in the hands of the
hunter group enjoying political goodwill.
On the national and local level, processes of
compartmentalization have been a disintegrative force on
the beluga whaling complex. Specific groups and sub-
groups have been limited in what they consider their
cultural and economic rights. Paradoxically, perhaps,
compartmentalization has also resulted in an integration of
each of the groups and sub-groups, as each of them now
has to stand united in order to be successful. Additionally,
the national allocation of access and disposition rights to
different compartments of the hunter community, while
upholding the common user right, reinforces the nation-
building project of the Home Rule—a project that can be
understood as integrative from a political perspective.
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